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Literature and philosophy
A common critical procedure in examining Murdoch's writing has been to measure her novels against her philosophy, to consider (for example) whether the behaviour of her characters and the events depicted in her plots exemplify or compromise her ethical principles. This is understandable given the remarkable clarity and consistency of her moral philosophy over four decades, the similarity between the scenarios repeatedly presented in her novels and the issues dealt with in her nonfiction, and perhaps also because of an implicit hierarchy which prevails in contemporary critical practice whereby theoretical pronouncements are privileged over fictional practice.
Yet I think there is a value in turning this relationship between Murdoch's philosophy and literature around, and recognizing that certain of her key philosophical concerns might usefully be regarded as fundamentally literary problems. At the very least, we need to acknowledge that her philosophical concerns run along similar lines to the questions explored by literary theorists. This is the starting point for this essay, which will concentrate on the significance of one particular 'literary' question in Murdoch's fiction and philosophy: narrative form.
In her philosophical writing, from the outset, Murdoch explored the significance of narrative in our lives, specifically in relation to morality.
'Vision and Choice in Morality ' (1956) examines the role in determining our actions played by what she terms 'personal fables'. The 'personal fable' is a 'meditation upon the conception of [one's] own life, with its selective and dramatic emphases and implications of direction'. A person regards his or her life 'as having a certain meaning and a certain kind of movement'. It may cause someone to consider themselves 'as set apart from others, by a superiority which brings special responsibilities, or by a curse, or some other unique destiny'.
2 In a later essay, 'Art is the Imitation of Nature' this theme has developed into a much more confident and universal assertion that:
[w]e are all story-tellers and we tell stories about people, and we tell these stories not only to other people but also to ourselves. We have in our activity as story-tellers a way of judging, a way of evaluating the world that surrounds us, and this gives us in return a sense of our own identity, our separateness, our own self-being (AIN, p. 253).
It is not an exaggeration to say that this statement summarizes Murdoch's chief preoccupation throughout her writing career, which dominated both her moral philosophy and her fiction. Essays such as these are concerned with the process of moral reasoning (in relation to established universal rules of morality) or the value of art and literature to moral judgement. We might argue that because of the centrality of this theme to her philosophy, it is not surprising that her fiction should constantly portray characters who, in different ways and for different reasons -and with varying degrees of success -impose narratives on their lives. As numerous novels show (A Severed Head, The Black Prince, The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, The Sea, the Sea) this is the distinctive strategy of the 'artist-figure' in Murdoch's novels (the polar opposite to the figure of 'the saint'), by which he interprets his own life and maintains power over others.
But the ubiquity of this motif in Murdoch's fiction is not the result of the author 'trying out' philosophical experiments in her writing. Murdoch's discomfort with the label 'philosophical novelist', which implied that her fiction was simply another form for her philosophical inquiry (as in the case of Sartre), is well documented. 3 Rather, it seems sensible to assume that Murdoch's interest in narrative is due to her own fascination with the practice of writing fiction. Central to her theory of fiction was the need to check the desire to create a narrative pattern in order to facilitate the presentation of believable characters.
